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The article presents a classroom-suited  version of the equilibrium exchange rate model of Stockman (1987) that 
features Cobb-Douglas functional forms for both production and utility, and considers foreign exchange 




1.  Introduction 
This article presents a simplified version of the equilibrium exchange rate model of Stockman (1987).  It aims to 
present a useful classroom teaching model of a complicated model.  Stockman=s (1987) model has been 
sometimes presented as the equilibrium exchange rate model in textbooks for undergraduates (e.g. G¨ artner, 1993, 
p. 204-210).  Actually, Stockman (1987) discusses informally several models that are particular cases of a more 
general (but messier) one introduced earlier in Stockman (1980) (e.g. Stockman, 1987, p. 14; also Stockman, 
1980, p. 689-692).  A novelty in this presentation is the use of Cobb-Douglas functional forms for both 
production and utility, together with an explicit modelling of foreign exchange intervention.  This procedure 
simplifies enormously the solution to the equilibrium model. 
The equilibrium approach to exchange rates is identified not only with the models presented in Stockman 
(1980 and 1987), but also with Lucas (1982), and Svensson (1985), among others.  Its concept of equilibrium 
refers to the assumption that markets clear through price adjustments, so equilibrium models typically assume that 
all prices are fully flexible.  In a sense, equilibrium models are the offshoot of the macro literature on real 
business cycles (Taylor, 1995, p. 24, n. 21).  Also, they are arguably equilibrium versions of the old-fashioned 
elasticity approach to the foreign exchange market (Stockman, 1980, p. 674, 693). 
The model of Stockman (1987), in particular, is based on simple microeconomic principles within an 
intertemporal optimizing framework.  Preference shifts and productivity shocks can change the real exchange  
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rate.  Accordingly, purchasing power parity (PPP) holds neither permanentlyCas in flexible-price ‘monetarist’-
type modelsCnor in the long run, as in the sticky-price Dornbusch (1976) model. 
The major argument of the model of Stockman (1987) is the following.  From microeconomics we know 
that real disturbances to demands for goods or supplies of goodsCsuch as preference shifts or productivity 
shocksCcause relative prices to change.  These encompass the relative price of foreign goods in terms of domestic 
goods, i.e. the real exchange rate defined as the terms of trade.  Nominal exchange rate changes need not lead to 
real changes, as in the Dornbusch model; rather, real exchange rate changes are an equilibrium response to 
underlying changes in real factors.  For that reason, neither nominal nor real exchange rate volatility are ‘good’ or 
‘bad’. 
As a consequence, there is a credible case to be made that governments should not invoke protectionist 
restrictions of trade in goods or financial assets as a response to changes in the exchange rates.  Foreign exchange 
intervention cannot affect the real exchange rate by altering the nominal rate through monetary policy.   
Intervention affects the real rate only if it signals the willingness to pursue policies that affect it (Stockman, 1987, 
p. 29).  Also, the choice of fixed versus flexible exchange rate on its own is not important for the real exchange 
rate, the trade balance, and the current account (Stockman, 1987, p. 12, 29).  Trade deficits do not cause currency 
depreciation, nor does currency depreciation on its own help to reduce a trade deficit (Stockman, 1987, p. 13).  
Thus, one cannot blame decreased competitiveness on the exchange rate. 
  Why should one be interested in the equilibrium exchange rate model?  One good reason is that deviations 
of real exchange rates from PPP appear to be persistent.  As observed, ‘the central puzzle in international business 
cycle is that real exchange rates are volatile and persistent’ (Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2000, p. 1).  In practice 
PPP does not seem to hold.  The equilibrium approach illustrates why this might not be so surprising.  Another 
reason is related to modelling.  A recent attempt to provide the traditional sticky-price Dornbusch model with 
microfoundations is the so-called ‘new open economy macroeconomics’ (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, chapter 
10).   A drawback with such an approach, however, is that models are complicated, though that in itself is not a  
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reason to reject the approach.  An attempt to simplify these models is the model of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).  
They use Cobb-Douglas functions and solve their model graphically.  Corsetti and Pesenti draw on some of the 
insights which are present in the Stockman’s (1987) model being discussed here.  So a further simplification of 
the model of Stockman using precisely Cobb-Douglas functions will be the objective of this paper. 
 
2.  The model 
Building on Stockman (1987), a two country model is developed.  The countries are identical except for the 
differences described below.  In particular, the countries have equal populations, and households in each country 
have the same tastes.  There are two normal perishable goods, say oranges and apples.  The domestic countryCsay 
the USCproduces only oranges, whereas the foreign countryCsay the UKCproduces only apples.  The number of 
units of the domestic good (oranges) produced each time period is denoted by Y t , and the quantity of the foreign 
good (apples) produced each time period is denoted by Y t
f.  There is perfect competition among producers.  The 
two countries trade with no barriers, transportation or transaction costs so that households can consume the same 
amounts of both goods as they have the same tastes and resources.  The model describes the world in each one of 
a series of time periods.  The intertemporal model is described by repeating the model (Table 1) at each time 
period (Stockman, 1987, p. 22).  The requirements needed for that setting to work are explained below. 
Instead of modelling production as a pure endowment, production of oranges and apples at each date is 
governed by a Cobb-Douglas technology, i.e. 
Y= KN tt t








α α   (2) 
where Kt is the domestic capital at time period t; Kt
f is the foreign capital at t;  Nt stands for the labour 
existing at t, and both countries are assumed to have equal labor Nt each period since they have the same  
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population each period; and α ∈(0,1) gives the capital share of income, assumed to be the same in the two 
countries.  (Given that production functions (1) and (2) are linearly homogeneous, the assumption that both 
countries have an equal number of residents could be relaxed, the model could be formulated in per capita terms, 
and K  could be interpreted as the capital labour ratio.)  
As both representative households in the two countries have the same tastes, they are assumed to have the 
same utility function U given by the Cobb-Douglas functional form as well, i.e. 
U= Y Y tt t
f 1- β β ch  (3) 
where β ∈(0,1) stands for the share of the domestic good to be consumed regardless of changes in the relative 
price (the real exchange rate) (Stockman, 1987, p. 17, n. 13).  The assumption of only one utility function for the 
two countries is implicit in most part of the informal analysis presented by Stockman (1987).  G¨ artner (1993, p. 
206), for instance, explicitly uses a unique utility function in his textbook, although not a Cobb-Douglas one.  
Stockman (1987, p. 17, n. 13) himself comments on a possible usage of a Cobb-Douglas functional form for 
utility. 
According to (3), both domestic and foreign households always spend at each date some fixed fraction of 
their incomes on each good, no matter what the real exchange rate is.  The domestic household consumption C is 
given by 
CY tt = β                                                                                                                                                                   (4) 
and the foreign household consumption C
f is 
C( 1 - ) Y t
f
t
f = β                                                                                                                                                          (5) 
Equation (4), for instance, says that the representative household in the US can, and wants to, allocate the same 
budget share to oranges at time period t, regardless of the relative price of apples in terms of oranges.  Since the 
domestic and foreign households have the same tastes, C( 1) Y tt
f =− β  and CY t
f
t = β  are also implied.  A Cobb-
Douglas utility function implies no wealth redistribution effects following either changes in tastes (occurring in  
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both countries equally) or productivity shocks (Stockman, 1987, p. 17,  n. 13). 
As in Stockman (1987, p. 22,  n. 18), households are assumed to discount future utility at the same rate, 
and (3) is a time invariant instantaneous utility function, in which lifetime utility is additively separable in first 
and second period consumption.  These assumptions enable equation (3) to hold each period. 
Another feature of the time separable Cobb-Douglas utility function is that it is a borderline case in which 
the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods is equal to one; as a consequence, trade is 
balanced each period (Stockman, 1987, p. 26, n. 20).  This will be clarified shortly.  The elasticity of substitution 
between foreign and domestic goods µ  is defined (Stockman, 1987, p. 19,  n. 15) as 
µ ≡−
(1/E )d(Y /Y )






  (6) 
where Et is the real exchange rate at time period t, as defined below.  Considering (1) and (2) together with (14) 
(to be presented below) as well as their appropriate derivatives in (6), it can be verified that actually µ =1 in the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
The price of the domestic good (oranges) at time period t is denoted by P t, whereas the price of the 
foreign good (apples) at t is expressed as P t
f.  As usual, the relative price of the foreign good in terms of the 









  (7) 
where St  is the nominal exchange rate at t defined as the price of the foreign currency (pounds) measured in 
terms of the domestic currency (dollars). 
If agents optimize, relative prices equal the marginal rate of substitution between goods in equilibrium.  In 
terms of this model that means that the real exchange rate is equal to the marginal rate of substitution in 











  (8) 
where ∂∂ U/ Y
f and ∂∂ U/ Y are the marginal utility of the foreign good and the domestic good respectively.  
Equation (8) is also given in G¨ artner's (1993, p. 205) presentation of the equilibrium model. 












KJ   (9) 
Equation (9) shows that a shift in tastes away from the domestic good toward the foreign good occurring in both 
countries equally at time period t (a fall in β ) increases the real exchange rate E in that period.  That occurs 
because the demand for the domestic good shrinks and the demand for the foreign good goes up simultaneously.  
The demand for the foreign good must increase as well because any reduction in the demand for the domestic 
good should be accompanied by an increase in the demand for something else, given household budgets, and also 
because perishable goods do not allow for savings (Stockman, 1987, p. 16).  Equation (9) shows, too, that factors 
affecting Y and Y
f are also able to change the real exchange rate, as discussed below. 
  That trade is balanced each period in this model can now be made clear.  Here the balance of payments B 
is 





f =                                                                                                                              (10) 
where Y-C are exports, and Y- C
ff  represent imports (e.g. Mankiw, 1997, chapter 7).  Considering (4), (5), and 
(7) in (10), equation (9) holds for B= 0 t . 

































δ ch   (12) 
where  M  and M
f  are money supply targets in the domestic and foreign country respectively; S  is a nominal 
exchange rate target; δ ∈∞ (0, ) stands for the income elasticity of money demand assumed to be the same in the 
two countries; and φ ∈∞ ∞ (- , ) is a policy parameter defining the type of foreign exchange intervention.  
Equations (11) and (12) are particular cases of standard LMs, to which the assumption of zero interest-elasticity 
of money demand is made along with the addition of a policy rule. 
A critical feature of the equilibrium model is the non-existence of either a precautionary or a speculative 
demand for money (the implications of dropping such an assumption can be appreciated in Stockman, 1987, p. 
25; p. 26, n. 22; p. 27,  n. 24).  Money demand depends only on income.  So in (11) and (12), the real money 
demand in each country in terms of that country's output good is a particular function of the country's real income 
measured in the country's output good, as in Stockman (1987, p. 18-19).  Another crucial assumption is that the 
demand for money in each country is expressed in terms of a different basket of goods (Stockman, 1987, p. 19).  
So money demands must differ across countries (Stockman, 1987, p. 19), as in (11) and (12).  Such an 
assumption is needed because it is possible to imagine measures of real money demands in each country that are 
invariant to both preference shifts and productivity shocks; for instance, the nominal money demand being 
proportional to nominal consumption (Stockman, 1987, p. 19). 
The policy rule underlying equation (11) is MM S / S tt t t = b g
φ
, where M  stands for the domestic money 
supply.  An analogous rule is implicit in (12).  Intervention follows such rules whereby the money supply is 
varied in response to current changes in the nominal exchange rate.  The polar cases of fixed and flexible 
exchange rates correspond to infinity and zero values, respectively, of the intervention parameter φ .  Leaning-
against-the-wind intervention is represented by φ ∈∞ (- ,0), whereas leaning-into-the-wind intervention is given 
by φ ∈∞ (0, ).  Such a policy rule is suggested by, for example, Marston (1985, p. 910) (see also Scarth, 1988, p. 
195, and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, p. 632).  
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Free float occurs when φ  is zero because in that situation the domestic central bank focuses exclusively 
on the target of the domestic money supply M , abstaining from any intervention in the foreign exchange market 
(Mt = Mt if φ =0).  The fixed exchange rate regime holds when φ  approaches infinity because in that case the 
domestic central bank focuses exclusively on its nominal exchange rate target S , without thinking about the 
domestic money supply (St = S t if φ →∞).  Despite the fact that M  is endogenous with a fixed exchange rate, 
there are no monetary consequences coming from the balance of payments because trade is balanced each period 
(B= 0 t ) in this model, as was previously noted. 
Leaning against the wind is the intervention operation that attempts to move the exchange rate in the 
opposite direction from its current trend, and leaning into the wind is motivated by the central bank's desire to 
support current exchange rate trends.  Both leaning against the wind and leaning into the wind are here carried out 
by changes in M .  It might be noted that whether such changes are sterilized is not discussed. 
Thus, if S>S for any reason, the aim of leaning against the wind is to reduce the current nominal 
exchange rate S.  That can be achieved by reducing M  because φ <0.  If S<S, the aim of the leaning-against-
the-wind intervention is to increase M .  Since leaning into the wind signifies supporting the current nominal 
exchange rate trend, if S>S that sort of intervention means increasing M  when φ >0.  Finally, if S<S, leaning 
into the wind implies reducing M .  A similar rationale applies to the foreign country. 
It should be noted in (11) and (12) that central banks in the two countries are assumed to coordinate their 
decisions (as in Stockman, 1980, p. 682, n. 17) concerning both nominal exchange rate targets and foreign 
exchange intervention; accordingly, S  and policy parameter φ  are the same in the two countries.  That 
assumption prevents game-theoretic aspects of the decisions to intervene in the foreign exchange market as well 
as international liquidity or reserve problems (Stockman, 1980, p. 682, n. 17).  This completes the description of 
the model. 
Table 1 summarises this version of the equilibrium exchange rate model, in which the seven endogenous  
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variables are S, P, P
f, E, Y, Y
f, and U. 
 
  TABLE 1: The equilibrium exchange rate model with Cobb-Douglas utility 
  and production functions and foreign exchange intervention 
   
 
  Y= KN ,  0 < < 1 tt t
1- αα α  (1) 






α α  (2) 
  U= Y Y ,  0 < < 1 tt t
f 1- β β






















































δ ch  (12) 
   
 
3.   Solution   
To find a solution for the nominal exchange rate we first insert equations (11) and (12) into (7), after using (1) 



















  (13) 
Equation (13) shows that the nominal exchange rate depends on money supply targets and capital stocks in both 
countries, the real exchange rate, and parameters α  and δ . 
Secondly, since PPP does not hold in this model even in the long run, the real exchange rate E is 












KJ   (14) 
Equation (14) shows that the real exchange rate depends on capital stocks (and productivity shocks) in both  
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countries, factor shares, and preferences of consumption over both domestic and foreign goods.  A shift in tastes 
away from the domestic good toward the foreign good occurring at time period t in the two countries equally 
(i.e. a fall in β ) increases the real exchange rate in (14), as in equation (9).  The real exchange rate also goes up if 
either domestic productivity rises or foreign productivity falls, because that implies increases in K  or reductions 
in K
f respectively (Stockman, 1987, p. 15). 
  The classical dichotomy holds in this model.  Nominal exchange rate changes do not cause real exchange 
rate changes.  This might seem at odds with definition (7).  However, S and E alike are endogenous variables 
which simultaneously respond to changing real factors, such as preferences and technology.  This might explain 
the stylized fact that nominal and real exchange rates are highly correlated.   However, an implication of this 
framework is that such a correlation cannot be exploited by government policy in the sense that foreign exchange 
intervention will fail to affect the real exchange rate by changing the nominal rate (Stockman, 1987, p. 12). 




















KJ  (15) 
The nominal exchange rate thus depends on the same factors affecting the real rate together with money supply 
targets in the two countries and the income elasticity of money demand δ .  Shifts in tastes affect the nominal rate 
in the same fashion as they alter the real rate.  As in monetary models, increases in the domestic money supply 
target and/or falls in the foreign money supply target push the nominal exchange rate up.  However, the response 
of the nominal rate to changes in both domestic and foreign productivities depends critically on the value of 
parameter δ . 
Both real and nominal exchange rates should also depend on the elasticity of substitution between foreign 
and domestic goods µ , which in this model is equal to one.  If a generic utility functionCrather than the specific 
Cobb-Douglas functional formChad been adopted, the parameter µ  would have appeared explicitly in (14) and 
(15).  For a generic utility function, Stockman (1987, p. 19, n. 15) shows that the elasticity of the real exchange  
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rate with respect to domestic productivity is equal to 1/µ , and the elasticity of the nominal exchange rate with 
respect to domestic productivity is equal to 1/ - µδ .  Since µ =1 in this model, the former elasticity is equal to 
one, and the latter is given by 1-δ .  Thus, the 1-δ  term in (15) gives the elasticity of the nominal exchange rate 
with respect to domestic productivity. 
The elasticity of the nominal exchange rate with respect to domestic productivity encompasses two effects 
coming from supply and demand sides, namely the ‘relative price effect’ and the ‘money demand effect’.  These 
effects push the nominal exchange rate in opposite directions in response to increases in domestic productivity 
(Stockman, 1987, p. 19).  A growth in domestic productivity that pushes domestic output up gives rise to a greater 
real exchange rate, and that causes the nominal rate to go up (equation (13)).  That is the relative price effect.  
However, the increased output also causes the money demand to rise, and that shrinks the nominal exchange rate. 
 That is the money demand effect. 
An increase (fall) in domestic (foreign) productivity can increase or reduce the nominal exchange rate in 
(15).  For sensible values of the income elasticity of money demandCi.e. δ ∈(0,1)Cincreases (falls) in domestic 
(foreign) productivity cause the nominal exchange rate to rise (i.e. to depreciate), because the relative price effect 
(µ =1) overshadows the money demand effect (δ ).  If δ ∈∞ (1, ), increases in K  and/or drops in K
f provoke S 
to fall, because the money demand effect is dominant.  When the two effects exactly compensate for each other 
(δ =1), neither domestic nor foreign productivity shocks can alter the nominal exchange rate.  In that case, the 
model collapses into a monetarist-type model (with tastes added up into the demand side) because only money 
supplies influence the nominal exchange rate. 
It might be noted that, since parameter φ  does not appear in either (14) or (15), foreign exchange 
intervention cannot affect either the real or nominal exchange rate.  It should be clear that this result depends 
crucially on the simplifications made in a benchmark model like this one, and does not hold in more sophisticated 
settings (Stockman, 1987, p. 29).  This will be discussed shortly.  Nevertheless, government intervention is not 
needed because neither high nominal exchange rate variability nor massive changes of the real exchange rate are  
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‘good’ or ‘bad’, in the sense that they reflect the necessary equilibrium adjustment to changing tastes and 
productivities.  Indeed, ‘variability of exchange rates is no more inherently undesirable than variability in a 
person's mood throughout a day, and both reflect underlying conditions and policies’ (Stockman, 1987, p. 29). 
The major success of the equilibrium model is to explain why PPP should not hold, as observed at the 
beginning of this paper.  Deviations of real exchange rates from PPP seem to be persistent.  Stockman (1987, p. 
28) argues that this degree of persistence appears to be too large to explain on the basis of disequilibrium models 
that postulate sticky nominal prices.  Indeed, the length of time over which an economy usually recovers from 
recessions would provide a rough estimate of the time it takes the price level to adjust to its new equilibrium 
following a shock.  This estimate would thus suggest a period of two to three years.  The Dornbusch model 
predicts that the real and nominal exchange rates should return toward their equilibrium levels when goods prices 
do.  But estimates suggest that nominal and real exchange rates take a much longer time (perhaps only after four 
to seven years) to begin returning to their original level.  However, the equilibrium approach that incorporates 
permanent real disturbances is consistent with real exchange rate persistence.  Also, the equilibrium approach is 
not at odds with the stylized fact that nominal and real exchange rates are highly correlated, as observed above.  
Here the rationale is that nominal and real exchange rates might be driven by a same common real factor, such as 
changing tastes and productivities. 
A drawback of this simple model is the apparent ineffectiveness of foreign exchange intervention.  Indeed, 
the volatility of real exchange rates seem to be much higher under systems of flexible exchange rates than under 
systems of fixed exchange rates.  Stockman observes (1987, p. 29), however, that there are many conditions (not 
all very realistic) that an economy must meet for the nominal exchange rate system to be totally irrelevant for real 
exchange rates.  One condition requires that all the other government policies are the same under both exchange 
rate systems (see Stockman, 1983).  If they are not, then the behaviour of real exchange rates may differ under the 
two systems even if the equilibrium model is the more useful approach.  Notwithstanding this fact, the 
equilibrium model has some other radically different other policy implications than do disequilibrium theories.   
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For instance, foreign exchange intervention cannot affect the real exchange rate simply by changing the nominal 
rate.  A policy may affect the nominal rate only if it signals a willingness to pursue policies that affect it and 
correspondingly a policy may affect the real rate only if it signals a willingness to pursue policies that affect it.  
Also, ‘undervalued’ or ‘overvalued’ currencies are not the issue, since exchange rates are only endogenous 
reflections of underlying market conditions and government policies (Stockman, 1987, p. 29). 
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
This article presents a classroom-suited version of the equilibrium exchange rate model of Stockman (1987) that 
features Cobb-Douglas functional forms for production and utility, and models foreign exchange intervention 
explicitly.  The model replicates the result that volatility is not either good or bad because it is a necessary 
response to changes in preferences and productivity.  Also, the policy implication of the equilibrium model that 
foreign exchange intervention is ineffective is shown in an explicit way. 
A reason good enough for one to be interested in the equilibrium model is the fact that deviations of real 
exchange rates from PPP seem to be persistent.  The equilibrium model should also be useful as an input for the 
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